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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
STUDENT NOTES
Prisoners-Enforcing Prisoners' Rights
The rights of the best of men are secure only as the rights
of the vilest and most abhorrent are protected.'
Chief Justice Burger has declared, "The problem of what we
should do with those who are found guilty of criminal acts . . . is
one of mankind's large, unresolved, and largely neglected problems." 2
Joining him, the Legal Counsel to the Federal Bureau of Prisons
believes, "The treatment and rights of a convicted prisoner are the
paramount issue in correctional law."' Finally, a leading authority
on correctional law admits that no "serious attempt at critical re-
search into the field of prisoners' rights has ever been made."4 This
note attempts to survey what appears to be a gradually dawning
awareness that the life of the law does not stop at stone walls.
SECTION I. HANDS-OFF CONCEPTS
The departure point for the law of prisoners' rights is the judge-
made concept that courts should keep their hands off the prison
system. One of the earliest phrasings of what is commonly called
the "hands-off doctrine" appears in Platek v. Aderhold.' There, a
prisoner sought his freedom through writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that prision officials had unjustly revoked his parole. Included
in the petition was the prisoner's alternative request that the warden
send petitioner's civilian clothes home to his wife. The habeas peti-
tion-immaterial to this discussion-was refused on the merits.
However, the court refused the second request with these words:
"The prison system of the United States is under the control of the
Attorney General and Superintendent of Prisons, and not of the
District Court. The court has no power to interfere with the conduct
of the prison or its discipline ....
Since Platek, courts have offered numerous variants of the
hands-off "doctrine," viz., "It is not within the province of the
courts ... ."; "courts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the con-
' People v. Gitlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 158, 136 N.E. 317, 327 (1922).
2Speeches to the American Bar Association, Aug. 10-11, 1969. U.S.
News and World Report, Aug. 18, 1969, at 9.3 Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the
Rights of the Convicted, 45 NnB. L. REv. 669, 672 (1966).4 S. RuBiN, Tim LAw oF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 623 (1963).
5 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1934).6 Id. at 175.
7 In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955
(1951).
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duct of the various [penal] institutions. ... ;8 "a court does not have
power ... to superintend ... *";' "it is not [the court's] province
to supervise prison discipline ... ."; and "courts do not have the
power and it is not their function or responsibility [to judge prison
discipline] ... ""
Though diverse in language, these expressions seem uniform in
one respect: all invoke a rule of law demanding exclusion of prison
life from the court's consideration. However, the courts have failed
to obey this self-made mandate, and the so-called hands-off "doctrine"
consequently seems to be little more than a hollow incantation.
The bench has repeatedly recited the hands-off formula, but
then has proceeded to dispose of a prisoner's petition on other
grounds, usually after considering the case's merits.12 In addition,
some courts have chosen to restate the hands-off formula in such a
way that they are able to examine the merits of the prisoner's petition
before them." When these courts refuse relief on the case's merits,
blame for their refusal often goes to the existence of a hands-off
"doctrine." Thus, whether hands-off is recited and then ignored, or
simply restated, the notion of a "doctrine" lives on.
A typical case of this sort is Childs v. Pegelow.14 Here, the
judges restated the hands-off formula so that it appeared to preclude
their considering prisoners' petitions "except in extreme cases" (mean-
ing here deprivation of constitutional rights). The court then denied
the sought-for relief (an order allowing prisoners unrestricted prac-
tice of Black Muslimism). Thus, the court had simply invoked a
rule of law, created an exception, and then denied relief on the basis
of this exception: a standard appellate procedure. However, the
result of this decision, and others like it,"5 is that in failing to meet
the standard of the court's freshly created exception, the frustrated
prisoner considers himself once again blocked by the "rule."
8 Rosheisen v. Steele, 193 F.2d 273, 278 (8th Cir. 1951).
9 Sturm v. McGrath, 177 F.2d 472, 473 (10th Cir. 1949).10 Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1948).
11 Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920, 921 (W.D. Mich. 1954).
12See, e.g., Heft v. Parker, 258 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1966). Similar
analysis of the hands-off concept can be found in Gallington, Prison
Disciplinary Decisions, 60 J. CGlm. L.C. & P.S. 152, 154 (1969).
1" See, e.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964).
14 1d.
Is See, e.g., Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
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Why is this result important to the law of prisoners' rights?
For the simple but critical reason that most of the court's information
on the state of the law of prisoners' comes from briefs drafted by
prisoners themselves-persons not generally aware of the subtleties
of judicial construction, nor of the inclination of appellate courts to
doctrinize a legal fiction.
To both prisoner and lawyer alike, however, the point of the
Pegelow case and its fellows is that the court has simply not followed
the dictates of the hands-off "doctrine." To the contrary, by delib-
erately delving into the petition's merits, the court has controverted
the mandate that they keep their hands off! However, as some
courts continue paying lip service to the hands-off formula-and
citing each other as "precedent"-the phantom hands-off "doctrine"
assumes the appearance of reality.
Looking at these cases from a different standpoint, another
pattern emerges. So many courts have employed the Pegelow ap-
proach-tailoring the hands-off formula to the exigencies of the
case before them' 6-that the formula itself has been swallowed by
its exceptions. A recent catalogue of this riddled state of the formula
is found in Roberts v. Pepersack: "
The rule that federal courts do not intervene in
matters involving prison discipline is ... subject to limita-
tion. What is needed to overcome the prison discipline
defense has been stated in various ways by federal courts:
"deprivation of a constitutional right," . . . "exceptional
circumstances," . . . if the acts of prison officials are not
"reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of impris-
onment," . . . "violation of a legal right or an abuse of
discretion by prison officials,"... "extreme circumstances,"
• .. "only in rare and exceptional situations," . .. [and in
the case of] "unreasonable regulations."' 8
A study of the hands-off cases discussed above leads to the
conclusion that insofar as "handsoff" remains a useful concept in
this area of law, it should refer not to binding legal doctrine, but to
an attitude of judges. The formula seems to represent a reluctance
to extend protection to prisoners, rather than the court's self-imposed
16Perhaps human nature prevails over legal doctrine in these cases;
judges may first give way to curiosity by looking beneath the hands-off
cloak, and then to an impulse to set right the undeniable wrongs their in-
vestigations often reveal.
17 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
'
81d. at 426.
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inability to exercise its power. "Hands-off" is perhaps most accur-
ately seen as a judicial posture, a sort of attitudinal inertia, that
requires persuasion by the merits of a case to be overcome.
Belief in the delegation of responsibility for prisoners' welfare,
plus the bench's long-standing respect for administrative discretion
appears to underlie judges' reliance on the hands-off approach. A
danger with both these views becomes apparent when applied to
incarcerating persons deemed dangerous to society. For the tendency
of prison officials is to justify their regulations by their duty to
maintain custody, thereby hoping to render any and all suppressions
of prisoners' rights self-validating and absolutely necessary. 9
However, though a court's hands-off tendencies be strong, its
foundation on grounds of delegation and discretion has been sub-
jected to vigorous attack. At least one federal court has conceded
that "a mere grant of authority cannot be taken as a blanket waiver
of responsibility in its execution. Numerous . . . agencies are vested
with extensive administrative responsibility. But it does not follow
that their actions are immune from judicial review."" Even where
delegated authority has been statutorily labeled "final," the courts
have not allowed themselves to be entirely precluded." One court
has, in fact, explicitly rejected the administrative-discretion argument,
stating that "the State's right to detain a prisoner is entitled to no
greater application than its correlative duty to protect him from
unlawful and onerous treatment." 2
As the preceding suggests, the foundation of the hands-off
approach has begun to crumble. As a result, many courts have sought
aid in the bench's old friend the "reasonableness test."23 In Fulwood
v. Clemner the court held that "a prisoner may not be unreasonably
punished for the infraction of a rule...; [that] a punishment out of
proportion to the violation may bring it within the bar against unrea-
sonable punishments."24 Another court in choosing the reasonable-
19 See, e.g., Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959).2o Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962).
21 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).22 People ex rel Brown v. Johnston, 215 N.Y. 44, 46, 174 N.E.2d 725,
726 (1961).
23 See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 862; Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944), cert
denied, 321 U.S. 783 (1944); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370(D.D.C. 1962); In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr.
472 (1962); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr.
753 (1961).24 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962).
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol73/iss1/6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ness standard admitted it was searching for "some middle ground
between these extremes [of prison tyranny and judicial takeover]."2
SECTION 11: HABEAS CORPUS AS REMEDY
Congress authorized federal courts to apply the writ of habeas
corpus to federal prisoners in 178926 and extended the writ's coverage
to state prisoners in 1867.7 Through decades of judicial construc-
tion, however, three barriers have arisen which deny federal and state
prisoners habeas corpus relief. The first is that the only justiciable
issue which may be considered is the legitimacy of confinement, not
the mode or manner.2 8 The second is that the prisoner has failed to
exhaust other available remedies.2 9 The third is that the only proper
relief under habeas corpus is absolute release from prison." These
restrictions on the habeas remedy will be discussed in order.
From the court's traditional restriction of habeas questions to
matters of how the prisoner became incarcerated, it appears at the
outset that a prisoner admitting the validity of his conviction is faced
with a more difficult problem than the usual "writ-writer." Never-
theless, there is an area of prisoners' rights where the legitimacy-of-
confinement barrier is weakening. This is chiefly where it is being
overridden by an expanded concept of the power of the writ."
An early example of this expanded concept (and also the rea-
sonableness test discussed previously) is found in re Rider. 2 There
the court held that prison prohibition of visits by a prisoner's attor-
ney, when related to the inmate's legal rights, may constitute an
unreasonable burden on the prisoner's right of access to the courts. 3
Likewise, courts have ruled that prison officials who restrict habeas
petitions in order to save the court time or embarrassment (presum-
25 United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143, 144
(S.D. N.Y. 1953).26 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
27 Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
28 See, e.g., Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1944).29 See, e.g., Johnson v. Dye, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
3 See, e.g., Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 822 (1952).
31 See, for example, the following statement: "[Habeas corpus] is not
now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has
grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals against
erosion of their rights to be free from wrongful restraints upon their
liberty." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
32 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 P. 965 (1920).33 See also Spires v. Down, 271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959); In re Chess-
man, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
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ably from obscenity)34 are not exercising lawful authority; the con-
sideration of such petitions must be left to the courts.3"
Furthermore, a recent Supreme Court decision36 in the prisoners'
rights area extends the court's protection to prisoners lending
assistance in drafing habeas writs for others. In this case the Supreme
Court agreed with the lower court that "for all practical purposes,
if such prisoners [seeking habeas] cannot have the assistance of a
'jailhouse lawyer,' their possibly valid constitutional claims will never
be heard in any court."3 The lower court had called petitioner's in-
carceration in solitary confinement unlawful use of a "jail within a
jail." 38
The second barrier to a prisoner's habeas relief is the operation
of the exhaustion doctrine. The federal statute builds this doctrine
into the habeas remedy with the words "application for writ . ..
shall not be graunted unless ...applicant has exhausted the rem-
edies available in the courts of the state. . . ."" This doctrine has
been generally considered the greatest single factor restricting the
use of federal habeas by state prisoners.4" For instance, the United
States Supreme Court once held that the exhaustion rule required
a prisoner desiring redress for rights violated by prison officials to
34Two prison wardens interviewed expressed concern over judges'
possible exposure to obscenity by inmates; the wardens justified their practice
of censoring court-addressed mail on this ground, plus that of protecting
the bench from being flooded with "lies about the prison." Interviews by
author with two West Virginia prison officials who wish to remain anonymous,
May, 1970.35 See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).3 6 1d.
171d. at 487, quoting Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966). The Supreme Court made the practical observation that "[i]n
the case of all except those who are able to help themselves-usually a few
old hands or exceptionally gifted prisoners-the prisoner [having to draft
his own writ] is in effect denied access to the courts unless such help is
available." Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969).38 Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 787 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). The
prisoner had been placed in solitary confinement by prison officials as
punishment for writing another prisoner's writ. The officials' traditional
argument in such instances is that the talented writ-writer will exact un-
reasonable payment from his "clients" in the form of money, homosexual
favors, or political debts in the prisoners' social system. See Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 499 (1969) (dissenting opinion). It is interesting to note that
this "jail within a jail" concept lends support to the legitimacy-of-confinement
kcriterion in this case, but in such manner as to grant relief to prisoners,
instead of its customary effect of preventing it.
39 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).4 0 Comment, Constitutional Law-Enforcement of Prison Discipline and
its Effect upon the Constitutional Rights of Those Imprisoned, 8 VL. L.
REv. 379, 389 (1963).
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first seek from his highest state court a writ of coram nobis---41
a procedure intended to correct errors at his trial! In other instances
courts have held that a prisoner's alleged failure to make use of a
Prisoners' Mail Box-theoretically a device for prisoners to send
uninspected complaints directly to high correctional officials-is fail-
ure to exhaust an available remedy and is thereby grounds for denying
habeas relief. 2 As one court summarized the practice:43
"[T]he doctrine of exhaustion was being deformed to
subject constitutional guarantees to the mercy of an ad-
verse social climate. The salutory doctrine was being used
to thwart justice, defeating its function as a valuable in-
cident to the American judicial system."
However, appearing right after the exhaustion formula in the
federal habeas statute are words creating an exception to the formula's
operation. The statute says a prisoner may apply for the writ despite
failure to exhaust state remedies if "there is either an absence of
available state corrective process, or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the pri-
soner."
44
Accordingly, four years after the coram-nobis decision,45 the
United States Supreme Court emphasized the statute's latter words,
declaring it unnecessary for a prisoner to seek both state habeas
relief and state-court certiorari in order to redress violations of his
rights by prison officials. 4' This seeming switch to relaxing the ex-
haustion rule, however, should be seen in harmony with the court's
gradual abandonment of the hands-off approach, its expanded con-
cept of the power of habeas corpus (discussed above), and its more
flexible view of available habeas remedies (to be discussed below).
The third obstacle to prisoners' use of habeas for protecting
their rights is the court's frequently held notion that the only remedy
available under habeas is absolute release of the prisoner from jail.4"
41 Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
42 Green v. United States, 283 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1960).
41 United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 10
(E.D. Pa. 1965).
44 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).4
' Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).46 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
4 Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 193 (1830); Williams v. Steele,
194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952); Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1944),
cert denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944). It has been pointed out that because of
the time-consuming requirements of the exhaustion rule, nearly all successful
writ applicants have been long-term inmates. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus.
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However, the federal statute reads merely that habeas remedies shall
operate "as law and justice require."4
Recent decisions have adopted the more flexible approach this
short phrase suggests.49 Judge Learned Hand has portrayed the
attitude of courts using this approach: "We find no more definite
rule than that the writ is available not only to determine points of
jurisdiction, stricti juris, and consitutional questions; but wherever
else resort to it is necessary to prevent a complete miscarriage of
justice."" ° The United States Supreme Court recently echoed this
approach, saying it has "steadfastly insisted that there is no higher
duty than to maintain [the habeas remedy] unimpaired.""1
The leading case in the area of flexible habeas remedies is
Coffin v. Reichard.2 There the court held a judge need not release
the prisoner, but could either return him to prison with directions
that his civil rights be respected, or transfer him to some other institu-
tion. 3 Although this case has been hailed as declaring the "counter-
principle to the hands-off doctrine," 4 since such "doctrine" is hon-
ored more in its breach than its observance," the case is better
considered another example of an emerging hands-on trend towards
enforcing prisoners' rights.5 6
Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L Rnv. 461 (1960).
By the time the writ-writer is sufficiently "exhausted" in the eyes of the law,
however, he is often ironically confronted with the relief-equals-release
construction, making judges loath to turn a now "dangerous long-termer"
loose on society. Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 510
(1963).
48 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964).49 See, e.g., People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 215 N.Y.S.
44, 174 N.E.2d 725 (1961).5 0United States ex rel. Kulich v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir.
1946) rev'd, 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
51 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969), citing Bowen v. Johnson,
306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
52 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).5 3 1 d, at 445. The court added that "When a man possesses a substantial
right, the courts will be diligent in finding a way to protect it. The fact that
a person is legally in prison does not prevent the use of habeas corpus
proceedings to protect his other inherent rights." Id. It is of interest that
at least once the Supreme Court, deeming itself bound by the relief-equals-
release approach, yet wanting to censure unconstitutional treatment by prison
officials, granted the prisoner "absolute release," but ordered that the
attorney general to be told the exact time of prisoner's release, so that he
could be rearrested. See Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 174 (1890).54 Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 511 (1963).
55 See text, supra, Section 1I.56 See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr.
753 (1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961). See also text and cases in
sections II and IV infra.
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SECTION M: COMMON LAW REMEDIES
The next few paragraphs concern enforcing prisoners' rights
in that area of the law not graced with statutory specificity. The
outcome of cases in this area rests largely on general common law
principles. As might be anticipated, many of the decisions concern
the reasonableness of prison regulations and officials' acts.17 Virtually
all of them in the last analysis depend on the judge's "posture" --
on whether personality, petitioner, or public opinion can persuade
him to join the judicial hands-on trend.
Many cases support the proposition that prison officials have
a duty to make only reasonable prison rules and must enforce them
in a reasonable manner.59 Thus, arbitrary restrictions of rights by
a prison official have been deemed an abuse of discretion which the
court will not tolerate. 0 In such cases the relief the court most often
grants is an injunction restraining the official from further such
abuse." However, at least one federal court has required the prison
superintendent to rewrite his prison's regulations and submit them for
court approval 62 -much as is done in the area of school plans for
racial desegregation.
Another common law remedy is mandamus directed to the
prison official, compelling him to guarantee petitioner's rights. One
court even construed this request from a prisoner's petition for habeas,
saying "It is the rule of federal courts that [habeas] applications
when drawn by laymen will be given a most liberal interpretation.""
7 This was the approach mentioned previously of courts that rejected
the hands-off approach and sought rationality in their decisions by employing
the reasonableness standard. See, for example, cases cited in notes 24 and
26, supra.
58 See text, Section I, supra.5 9 E.g., Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Fullwood
v. Clemner, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Davis v. Superior Court, 175
Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959); State v. Revis, 193 N.C. 192, 136
S.E. 346 (1927).60 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Fulwood v.
Clemner, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962). In this connection one court
has declared, 'That which degrades and embrutes a man cannot be either
necessary or reasonable." State v. Nipper, 166 N.C. 272, 275; 81 S.E. 164,
165 (1914).
61 Usually the prison warden is designated by the court as respondent.
6 2 Fulwood v. Clemner, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
6 3 See, e.g., State ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.
1957).
64Id, at 912, citing Thomas v. Teets, 205 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1953).
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One group of mandamus cases concerns prisoners' attempts to
prevent officials from inspecting and censoring their mail.6" Of
course, it is well known that First Amendment freedoms "are among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties" protected by the United
States Constitution.66 However, it appears in the court's use of the
reasonableness standard for judging prison regulations, that little
consideration is given to the nature of the right a regulation allegedly
violates.6 Thus, in prisons First Amendment freedoms do not yet
enjoy a preferred status, and prisoners' attempts to protect their mail
through mandamus have been futile.68
Prisoners have also submitted petitions to the court in the
form of "complaints" which invoke the right to constitutional guar-
antees. A typical case is Nichols v. McGee, 9 where a prisoner pro-
tested the racial segregation established by prison regulations. The
court refused to apply the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education,"
accepting instead the prison's traditional justification that its regula-
tions were necessary to maintain control of prisoners.7
It may seem that the courts' infrequent granting of mandamus
renders this remedy impractical. Nevertheless, mandamus remains
at least a means of drawing matters to the court's attention. Espe-
cially in an area of the law changing as rapidly as is prisoners' rights,
the need for courts to be apprised of prison life is crucial-courts
cannot cure what they cannot see. As at least a potential remedy for
enforcing prisoners' rights, mandamus should not be overlooked.
One seldom-used but effective remedy for enforcing prisoners'
rights is based on the court's contempt power.72 The reasoning is
that the only authority prison officials have for detaining prisoners
is the mittimus issued the official by the court when the prisoner was
sentenced. Thus, if the official departs from reasonably executing the
authorized sentence, he is subject to contempt. Note, this approach
65 Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948); Fulwood v. Clemner,
206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D.
Pa. 1958). Mail inspection and censorship were routine at the maximum
security prison this author visited.66 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).67 See, e.g., Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
68 See cases cited in note 65, supra.
69 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6
(1959).
70 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71 Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Cal. 1959).72 See, e.g., In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1899); howard v. State,
74 Ariz, 117, 245 P.2d 268 (1952).
10
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avoids the official's traditional defenses of delegated responsibility
and administrative discretion by simply making him an ex officio
officer of the court!
Still another common law concern is whether prisoners can
recover for injuries received at the hands of prison officials. Of
course, the prisoner's biggest hurdle in a suit against prison officials
is the doctrine of sovereign immunity-government and its officers
performing official duties are immune from civil suit unless govern-
ment waives this immunity. Yet even where the government waives
sovereign immunity, most jurisdictions do not yet allow prisoners'
suits for assault or libel. 3 Thus prisoner suits are effectively limited
to those involving prison officials' negligence.
The main hurdle to recovering for negligent injury is the prison-
er's having to prove that an official owed him a duty, the perform-
ance of which did not require the exercise of judgment."4 Neverthe-
less, prisoners have successfully cleared both hurdles-sovereign
immunity and official judgment-and have been awarded compen-
sation by the courts. "The law imposes the duty on a jailor to exer-
cise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence to prevent unlawful
injury to a prisoner placed in his custody . ...",'
Examples of prisoners' successful suits against officials include:
failing to keep the prison sanitary,7" confining prisoner with another
who was violently insane,77 and many instances of negligent operation
of prison workshops."'
SECTION IV: CML RIGHTS AcTs
The effect of criminal conviction upon one's civil status is not
made clear by statutes of the various states; none of them attempts to
define prisoner status in any inclusive manner.79 Some state statutes
appear to visit "civil death" upon prisoners."0 Such statutes inspire
occasional decisions to the effect that the status of prisoner inmates
73 Note, The Problem of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners
Rights, 53 IowA L. REv. 671, 703 (1967).
74See e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Bush v. Bobb,
23 Ill. App. 2d 317, 162 N.E.2d 594 (1959).7
- Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 821, 7 S.W.2d 230, 232 (1928).
76 Clark v. Kelly, 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S.E. 365 (1926).
77Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940).78 E.g., Duffy v. State, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757, 197 N.Y. Misc. 2d 569 (Ct. Cl.
1950); Paige v. State, 281 N.Y.S. 98, 245 N.Y. App. Div. 126 (1935).
79 S. R~r~n, Cnm , .ConnECTON, 623 (1963).8 0 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601 (West Supp. 1966; N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 511 (McKinney 1967).
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is outside the protection of society's laws.8" In fact, one rather severe
summation of prisoner civil status proclaims a convicted felon "has,
as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all
his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords
to him. He is for the time being the slave of the state."82 Largely
through Justice Department efforts, these judicial attitudes have
changed. In the 1950's the Civil Rights Section of the Justice De-
partment instituted actions on behalf of federal prisoners under the
theory that inmates in federal prisons were being denied civil rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. The Department's winning argu-
ment in a major prisoners' rights case83 pierced the heart of the slave-
of-the-state concept. The argument was that the fourteenth amend-
ment applies to all persons; even if a prisoner has been deprived of
some privileges of "citizenship," he is still a "person." 4 Furthermore,
federal precedent had held that "due process of law and equal pro-
tection of the laws are guaranteed not only to citizens but to any
person, and [the 1871] Civil Rights Act provides a remedy for
deprivations of these rights."
How do civil rights statutes operate to enforce prisoners' rights?
The Civil Rights Act of 1948"6 attaches criminal penalties of a thou-
sand dollars fine or one year's imprisonment or both for the violation
of statutory provisions established by the Civil Rights Act of 1871.87
The 1871 Act-designed to guarantee Fourteenth Amendment Rights
-makes state officials depriving any person of his civil rights under
color of law "liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.""
Following Justice Department advances on the criminal front
of federal civil rights, substantial precedent has accumulated allow-
ing prisoners themselves to sue prison officials under civil rights
81 Hill v. Gentry, 182 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo. 1960).
82 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
83 United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953).
84 Caldwell & Brodie, Enforcement of the Criminal Civil Right Statute,
18 U.S.C. Section 242, In Prison Brutality Cases, 52 GEO. L.J. 706, 726, 727
(1964). Caldwell is the former Chief of the Civil Rights Branch, U.S.
Justice Dept.8 5 Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477, 479 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
86 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964). An amendment, added in 1968, increased
the penalty to a term of years or life in prison in the event death results.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1965-1969 Supp. V).
8742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
88 1d.
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statutes.89 The current status of prisoners' rights in general is sum-
marized by the court in United States v. Jackson."" Even though the
petitioner was a convict, "he did not, on that account, cease to be
an inhabitant of the State of Arkansas nor become divested of all
rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment."'" The court
then repeated an earlier federal holding that "A convicted prisoner
remains under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment except
as to those rights expressly or by necessary implication taken from
him by law." 92
Moreover, prisoners seeking federal civil rights relief can no
longer be stopped by operation of an exhaustion-of-remedies doc-
trine, such as has hampered their efforts in seeking federal habeas
relief. 3 Courts now generally hold that "the fact that state officers
are violating state as well as federal laws does not exonerate them
from penalties under the latter."'94
Although prison officials have received criminal penalties for
denying prisoners' rights,95 most relief sought under civil rights acts
has been injunctive. 6 Helpful to indigent prisoners in these actions
is a federal statutory provision allowing them to bring civil rights
suits at no cost to themselves.97
Physical mistreatment by prison officials frequently results in
relief being granted.98 Cases now hold that prison discipline may not
89 See, e.g., Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F. 2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); Coleman
v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F.
Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955). All these cases allowed prisoner suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).90 235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956).
91 id, at 929.92 1d., citing United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953);
United States v. Walker, 216 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1954).9 3 See text, Section II, supra, for discussion of exhaustion doctrine in
connection with habeas corpus remedy. It has long been noted that federal
courts once ducked a number of cases brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964) by calling the matter one of state court jurisdiction; then
state courts would dismiss the case entirely by calling the matter one of
executive jurisdiction, not judicial. Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review The Complaints of Convicts, 72
YALE L.J. 506, 512 (1963).94 United States v. Jones, 207 F. 2d 785, 786 (5th Cir. 1953); See also
Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).95 See, e.g., Apodaoa v. United States, 188 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1951).
96 Gallington, Prison Disciplinary Decisions, 60 J. Cimr. L.C. & P.S.
152, 161 (1969).
97 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1964).
98 See, e.g., Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957); Gordon
v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
[Vol. 73
13
Campbell: Prisoners--Enforcing Prisoners' Rights
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971
STUDENT NOTES
be excessive in severity or duration,99 "shock general conscience,"' °0
be "intolerable to fundamental fairness, 1°1 or cruel according to
present standards of decency." 2 Such statements reflect the con-
cept underlying the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the
ConstitutionI° --that the punishment must fit the crime, and any
punishment beyond this ought not be allowed."0 4
Another type of frequently granted relief concerns prisoners'
medical care.' Courts have held a prison's failure to provide ade-
quate medical care violates prisoners' rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 6 It can even amount to cruel and unusual punish-
ment.0o
Still another area of successful civil rights application concerns
freedom of religion. Of course, since the theory of civil rights rests
ultimately in the Fourteenth-not the First-Amendment, court opin-
ions in this area are based on equal protection grounds rather than
freedom-of-religion. In 1961 two key cases in this area saw prisoners
win injunctive relief against prison officials who had arbitrarily
refused them practice of Black Muslimism.
From an overall survey of cases enforcing prisoners' rights,
it appears most successes have occurred in federal rather that state
courts. If this means state judges still favor the hands-off stance,
then state prisoners can now resort directly to federal courts under
the civil rights statutes. In fact, state prisoners may even fare better
than federal inmates under the Civil Rights Act of 1871..For techni-
cally the Act applies only to deprivations of rights under color of
law of a "state or territory."'0 9 This could bar prisoners' recovery
99 Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).10 0 Id, at 679, citing Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965).
101 Id.
102 Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
'
0 3 U. S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
1
0 4 The Supreme Court has categorized cruel and unusual punishment
into 1) that which would shock the general conscience under all circum-
stances; 2) that punishment which is disproportionate to the offense; and 3)
that punishment going beyond what is necessary to achieve a legitimate
penal aim. See Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).105 See, e.g., McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
0 6 Id. The failure to provide medical facilities was held to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from deprivation of life or
property.
107 Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
103 Pierce v. La Valee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow,
291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).109 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
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against federal officials in federal prisons. Nevertheless, courts have
not allowed prisoners' rights to be disregarded in federal prisons
merely by the verbal inadequacies of one statue. In Walker v.
Blackwell the court invoked a federal mandamus statute, authorizing
federal courts "to compel an officer . . . of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed. . . the plaintiff."1" Prisoners
were thereby ensured their right to religious practice in federal
prisons.
CONCLUSION
In 1968 there were 426,000 prison inmates in the United States,
serving their time at a cost of $1 billion a year.' 2 Before he became
Chief Justice, Judge Warren E. Burger candidly portrayed their
situation: "'
Having found the accused guilty, . . . we seem to lose our
collective interest in him. In all but a few states we im-
prison this defendant in places where he will be a poorer
human being when he comes out than when he went in-
a person with little or no concern for law,... very often
with a fixed hatred of authority and order, and he is mind-
lessly and aggressively determined to live by plundering
and looting.
The President's Task Force on Corrections has stated that
ignoring the effect of prison tyranny on the lives of prisoners
would mean, "in effect, that our Nation would continue to
avoid, rather than confront, one of its most critical social problems;
that it would accept for the next generation a huge, if not immeasur-
able, burden of wasted and destructive lives."" 4 Enforcing prisoners'
rights is a crucial step in the right direction. In the words of the
Task Force, "decisive action ... could make a difference that would
really matter within our own time.""..5
Arthur W. Campbell
110 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
112 6 AM. CRIm. L.Q. 133 (1968).
"
3 Address at Ripon College, May, 1967, U.S. News and World Report,
June 2, 1969, at 84.
"1 4 TAsK FORCE ON CoRREcrIoNs, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEmENT AND ADMINISTRATON OF JusncE, at 114 (1967).
115 Id.
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